M PRA Munich Personal RePEc Archive Charity Auctions for the Happy Few Olivier Bos Panth´eon-Assas University

First Page		Document Content
Date: 2015-12-05 10:00:19 Auction theory Game theory Economy Business First-price sealed-bid auction Vickrey auction All-pay auction Auction Revenue equivalence Eauction Bidding Bid shading		M PRA Munich Personal RePEc Archive Charity Auctions for the Happy Few Olivier Bos Panth´eon-Assas University Add to Reading List Source URL: mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de Download Document from Source Website File Size: 785,12 KB Share Document on Facebook

	CS364A: Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture #5: Revenue-Maximizing Auctions∗ Tim Roughgarden† October 7, DocID: 1rbWw - View Document
	CS364A: Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture #4: Algorithmic Mechanism Design∗ Tim Roughgarden† October 2, DocID: 1r3wI - View Document
	CS364A: Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture #8: Combinatorial and Wireless Spectrum Auctions∗ Tim Roughgarden† October 16, 2013 DocID: 1qSxh - View Document
	The RAND Corporation Strategic Nonparticipation Author(s): Philippe Jehiel and Benny Moldovanu Source: The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Spring, 1996), ppPublished by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf DocID: 1qJxb - View Document
	CS364A: Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture #2: Mechanism Design Basics∗ Tim Roughgarden† September 25, DocID: 1qE6n - View Document