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Economics / Matching / Applied mathematics / Combinatorial optimization / Mathematical economics / Stable marriage problem / Core / Preference / Assignment problem / Game theory / Mathematics / Cooperative games
Date: 2007-07-09 15:42:47
Economics
Matching
Applied mathematics
Combinatorial optimization
Mathematical economics
Stable marriage problem
Core
Preference
Assignment problem
Game theory
Mathematics
Cooperative games

Matching: Finding a Partner for Life or Otherwise Dale T. Mortensen The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 94, Supplement: Organizations and Institutions: Sociological and Economic Approaches to the Analysis of Social S

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