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Consumer theory / Economic theories / Game theory / General equilibrium theory / Supply and demand / Perfect competition / Leuven / Microeconomics / Innovation / Economics / Politics of Belgium / Katholieke Universiteit Leuven
Date: 2013-09-27 09:38:23
Consumer theory
Economic theories
Game theory
General equilibrium theory
Supply and demand
Perfect competition
Leuven
Microeconomics
Innovation
Economics
Politics of Belgium
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven

R&D in GEM-E3 EU, some experiments Denise Van Regemorter Workshop: Modeling the economic Impact of EU ICT R&D expenditure Sevilla, April[removed]

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