Two-Sided Bandits and the Dating Market Sanmay Das Center for Biological and Computational Learning and Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Lab Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cambridge, MA 02139

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Date: 2006-08-08 10:56:19 Matching Combinatorics Game theory Fellows of the Econometric Society Cooperative games Stable marriage problem CC Reinforcement learning Multi-armed bandit Alvin E. Roth Greedy algorithm Algorithm		Two-Sided Bandits and the Dating Market Sanmay Das Center for Biological and Computational Learning and Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Lab Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cambridge, MA 02139 Add to Reading List Source URL: faculty.chicagobooth.edu Download Document from Source Website File Size: 103,81 KB Share Document on Facebook

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