The Perverse Incentives of International Institutions William Spaniel∗ February 24, 2015 Abstract International institutions commonly reduce costs states suffer in a variety of contexts. I argue that evaluating such in - incentives - Document - PDFSEARCH.IO

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	The Perverse Incentives of International Institutions William Spaniel∗ February 24, 2015 Abstract International institutions commonly reduce costs states suffer in a variety of contexts. I argue that evaluating such in Add to Reading List Document Date: 2015-02-24 14:28:53 Open Document File Size: 371,61 KB Share Result on Facebook City Rochester / / Currency USD / / / Facility University of Rochester / Harkness Hall / / Organization World Trade Organization / Department of Political Science / International Atomic Energy Agency / United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees / University of Rochester / United Nations / United Nations Mine Action Service / / Person William Spaniel / / / Position High Commissioner for Refugees / actor / neutral actor / / ProvinceOrState New York / / Technology bargaining protocol / / URL http / SocialTag Bargaining theory Commerce Incentive Costs Business Economics Cooperative games Law Bargaining

The Perverse Incentives of International Institutions William Spaniel∗ February 24, 2015 Abstract International institutions commonly reduce costs states suffer in a variety of contexts. I argue that evaluating such inAdd to Reading List