| Document Date: 2011-09-21 12:21:33
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Company P. Some / Naval Research Laboratory / / / Facility The University of Texas / University of Texas / / IndustryTerm probabilistic processing delay dproc / Low-latency anonymous communication protocols / synchronization protocol / cascade routers / anonymity protocol / guard routers / users select routers / guard router / host network / redundant router / exit router / earliest low-latency systems / low-latency anonymity protocols / exit routers / low-latency systems / onion-routing protocol / Internet applications / low-latency protocol / final router / few proposed solutions / return router / Low-latency protocols / mix network / reputation systems / connection protocol / adversarial routers / intermediate routers / onion routers / communication protocols / volunteer network / anonymity network / ith router / adjacent router / Internet communications / / OperatingSystem DoS / / Organization University of Texas at Austin / National Science Foundation / Austin Department / Yale University / / Person Aaron Johnson / Paul Syverson / Joan Feigenbaum / / Position guard / / ProvinceOrState Texas / / PublishedMedium the Proceedings / / Technology intermediate routers / ith router / Low-latency protocols / adjacent router / two routers / exit router / onion routers / non-adversarial routers / onion-routing protocol / redundant router / low-latency protocol / Low-latency anonymous communication protocols / one last router / 1500 routers / connection protocol / exit routers / 2010 Privacy-Enhancing Technologies / just two routers / just one router / final router / users select routers / anonymity protocol / cascade routers / return router / low-latency anonymity protocols / guard router / one exit router / using router / synchronization protocol / guard routers / adversarial routers / one guard router / 1 Introduction Anonymous communication protocols / proposed protocol / /
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The University of Texas at Austin Department of Computer Science Preventing Active Timing Attacks in Low-Latency Anonymous Communication Joan Feigenbaum, Aaron Johnson, and Paul Syverson