U.S. Cleland / Google-AdMob / Mojiva / AdMob / GoogleDoubleClick / New York Times / Washington Business Journal / Yahoo / Reuters / CNN / Apple / Millenial Media / NetCompetition / DoubleClick / Investors Business Daily / Google / YouTube / Morgan Stanley Internet / Jumptap / ComScore / AOL / Microsoft / Precursor LLC / Quattro Wireless / /
Currency
USD / / /
Event
M&A / Business Partnership / Person Communication and Meetings / /
Facility
Apple iTunes Store / /
IndustryTerm
search market share / advertising model / online video kingdom / advertising platform / search dominance / search advertising monopoly power / mobile Internet ecosystem / serious online advertising competition / serious search competition / advertising monetization engine / Online Advertising Industry / advertising monetization platform / advertising marketplace / measure search advertising / mobile in-application advertising / mobile advertising marketplace / advertising syndication / mobile applications / advertising market / mobile Internet applications / online video / e-forum / broader mobile advertising marketplace / mobile search market share / advertising / mobile inapplication display advertising market / search/contextual / display advertising performance / Internet economy / mobile application developers / mobile Internet / mobile in-application display advertising market / Internet content / Internet long term / in-application advertising / mobile advertising kingdom / wireless connections / search market shares / mobile search advertising / advertising competition / mobile advertising position / Internet audience / advertising agreement / advertising competitive platforms / contextual advertising / sufficient competition / software model / overall advertising market / search advertising monopoly / mobile advertising ecosystem long term / online video distribution platform / search / diverse applications / wireless minutes / application advertising / search share / search competitor / search engine / search advertising / mobile advertising / /
OperatingSystem
Crux / Windows Mobile / Symbian / Android / /
Organization
Federal Trade Commission / Federal Communications Commission / Cornell University Law School / U.S. Department of Justice / Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust / DOJ / House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on the Internet / Federal Government / /
Person
Eric Schmidt / Clayton Act / Scott Cleland / Mary Meeker / /
Position
independent telecom analyst / President / author / CEO / special counsel / Chairman / director / prescient analyst / analyst / /
Product
iPhone / HTC Nexus One Smartphone / Apple iPhone / Google-DoubleClick / /
ProgrammingLanguage
V / /
PublishedMedium
New York Times / the DoubleClick review / National Journal / the GoogleDoubleClick review / /
Technology
mobile phones / operating system / html / broadband / search engine / Android / pdf / cellular telephone / /
Googleopoly V* Why the FTC Should Block Google-AdMob The Top Ten Reasons Why Google-AdMob Would “Substantially Lessen Competition” By Scott Cleland** President, Precursor LLC