DePaul University / Emory University / Behavioral Research Council / Indiana University / Bloomington / Princeton University / payo¤s.1 Kelley School of Business / /
Person
Tom Borcherding / Henry James / Ricky Lam / Jack Ochs / David Kreps / Nancy Jianakoplos / John Dickhaut / Al Roth / Canice Prendergast / John Pratt / Koo Cho / Christopher Avery / Nicholas Barberis / William Ziemba / L.J. Savage / Ian Jewitt / Roland Benabou / Ulrich Schmidt / Rachel Croson / Jean Tirole / Joan Costa / Terrance Odean / Enrico Diecidue / David Scharfstein / Todd Milbourn / Robert Bushman / Tatiana Kornienko / Ron Harstad / Judith Chevalier / Milton Friedman / Steven Berglas / Catherine Eckel / Mathias Dewatripont / Colin Camerer / Richard Shockley / Alexandra Bernasek / Bill Harbaugh / Bengt Holmstrom / Joel Sobel / Brad Barber / Robert Schlaifer / Uri Gneezy / Lars Stole / Jeremy Stein / Glenn Ellison / Miles Kimball / Stephen Morris / Peter Wakker / David Bell / Daniel Kahneman / Phillip Grossman / David Laibson / Harold Mulherin / Amos Tversky / Richard Thaler / John Atkinson / Chandra Kanodia / Anjan Thakor / Matthew Rabin / /
Position
manager of a successful project / manager of a failed project / manager / broker / skilled manager / /
Prospect Theory or Skill Signaling? Rick Harbaugh Under revision for invited resubmission to American Economic Review Abstract Failure is embarrassing. In gambles involving both skill and chance, we show that a strategic