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Matching / Stable marriage problem / Alvin E. Roth / Optimal matching / Strategyproof / Game theory / Mathematics / Problem solving


Document Date: 2009-12-10 10:12:26

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City

Cambridge / New York City / Boston / New York / /

Company

the New York Times / /

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Facility

Duke University / A stable / The stable / Massachusetts Institute of Technology / Harvard University / /

IndustryTerm

deferred acceptance algorithms / acceptance algorithm / stable matching algorithm / deferred acceptance algorithm / /

Organization

Duke University / Spencer Foundation / Society of Fellows / Durham NC / Harvard University / Department of Economics / National Science Foundation / MIT / Massachusetts Institute of Technology / Department of Education / Harvard Business School / /

Person

Onur Kesten / Aytek Erdil / David Freedman / Alvin E. Roth / David E. Gale / Flip Klijn / Guillaume Haeringer / Elliot Peranson / Lars Ehlers / Susan Athey / Fuhito Kojima / Neil Dorosin / Tayfun Sönmez / Paul Milgrom / Parag A. Pathak / Lloyd S. Shapley / Caterina Calsamiglia / Lester E. Dubins / Marilda Sotomayor / Michel Balinski / /

Position

active strategic player / deputy chancellor / /

Product

ZTE C78 Cellular Phone / /

ProgrammingLanguage

php / /

ProvinceOrState

Massachusetts / /

PublishedMedium

the New York Times / New York Times / /

Technology

deferred acceptance algorithms / acceptance algorithm / Simulation / stable matching algorithm / deferred acceptance algorithm / /

URL

http /

SocialTag