sc_experiment_2004[removed]dvi

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Date: 2010-11-04 17:09:26 Mathematics Stable marriage problem University and college admission Pareto efficiency Preference Experimental economics Education reform School voucher Alvin E. Roth Game theory Education Economics		sc_experiment_2004[removed]dvi Add to Reading List Source URL: fmwww.bc.edu Download Document from Source Website File Size: 194,09 KB Share Document on Facebook

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