Back to Results
First PageMeta Content
Finance / Financial crises / Financial crisis / Market discipline / Systemic risk / Bank / Too big to fail / Central bank / Argentine Currency Board / Economics / Banking / Financial economics


Market Discipline under Systemic Risk: Evidence from Bank Runs in Emerging Economies
Add to Reading List

Document Date: 2005-12-12 06:15:27


Open Document

File Size: 251,26 KB

Share Result on Facebook

City

Porto / /

Company

Argentina Financial Sector Review / Development Research Group / /

Continent

Europe / /

Country

Uruguay / Mexico / Chile / Peru / Colombia / United States / Brazil / Argentina / India / /

/

IndustryTerm

last / countries bank capital / bank risk / bank stakeholders / generalized banking crises / recent banking crises / bank fundamentals / financial systems / troubled banks / healthier banking sector / money printing / monetary and banking system soundness / prudential tool / bank failures / bank managers / bank run / bank accounts / bank solvency / bank-specific risk / past bank fundamentals / bank / provisioned banks / recent bank runs / bank deposits / banking / bank runs / through bank fundamentals / resilient banking sector / bank exposure / /

Organization

World Bank / Central Bank of Argentina / Basel Committee on Banking Supervision / Chicago Fed / Central Bank of Uruguay / /

Person

Pedro Pou / Claudio Irigoyen / Federico Droller / Maria del Pilar Casal / Eduardo Levy-Yeyati / Marina Halac / Juan Miguel Crivelli / David Llewellyn / Hernán Rodriguez / Cavallo / Martinez Peria / Francisco Gismondi / Luciana Ríos-Benso / Juan Carlos Gozzi Valdez / Sergio Schmukler / Martín Vallcorba / Maria Soledad Martinez Peria / José Antonio Licandro / Roberto Rigobón / Jorge Polgar / /

Position

economic minister / 12months non-deliverable forward / president / manager / general economic conditions / professor at the Universidad Torcuato Di Tella / Executive / /

SocialTag