![Asymmetric information / Market failure / Organizational theory / Principalagent problem / Preference / Utility / Moral hazard / Optimal tax Asymmetric information / Market failure / Organizational theory / Principalagent problem / Preference / Utility / Moral hazard / Optimal tax](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/c9553abf9cc022b8129487df64ffdac8.jpg) Date: 2011-02-21 08:52:52Asymmetric information Market failure Organizational theory Principalagent problem Preference Utility Moral hazard Optimal tax | | On the First-Order Approach in Principal-Agent Models with Hidden Borrowing and Lending Árpád Ábrahám,ySebastian Koehne,z and Nicola Pavoni x DecemberAbstractAdd to Reading ListSource URL: apps.eui.euDownload Document from Source Website File Size: 322,63 KBShare Document on Facebook
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