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BNE and Auction Theory Homework 1. For two agents with values U [0, 1] and U [0, 2], respectively: (a) show that the first-price auction is not socially optimal in BNE. (b) give an auction with “pay your bid if you win
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Document Date: 2017-07-28 06:04:18
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BNE and Auction Theory Homework 1. For two agents with values U [0, 1] and U [0, 2], respectively: (a) show that the first-price auction is not socially optimal in BNE. (b) give an auction with “pay your bid if you win