Corrections and updates for third printing of Osborne and Rubinstein’s “A Course in Game Theory” (MIT Press, [removed]We thank the following people for pointing out errors and improvements: Lorand Ambrus-Lak

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Date: 2012-09-25 13:27:21 Economics Extensive-form game Nash equilibrium Bayesian game Normal-form game Harold W. Kuhn Function Core Game theory Mathematics Problem solving		Corrections and updates for third printing of Osborne and Rubinstein’s “A Course in Game Theory” (MIT Press, [removed]We thank the following people for pointing out errors and improvements: Lorand Ambrus-Lak Add to Reading List Source URL: www.economics.utoronto.ca Download Document from Source Website File Size: 71,96 KB Share Document on Facebook

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