First Page | Document Content | |
---|---|---|
Date: 2014-03-26 06:49:17Auction theory Game theory Mechanism design Mathematics Auctions Marketing Vickrey auction Vector-valued function Auction Revenue equivalence Envelope theorem | Journal of Economic Theory 85, 258Article ID jeth, available online at http:www.idealibrary.com on Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities* Philippe JehielAdd to Reading ListSource URL: www.econ2.uni-bonn.deDownload Document from Source WebsiteFile Size: 264,73 KBShare Document on Facebook |
On Elicitation and Mechanism Design Bo Waggoner, UPenn JanuaryDocID: 1xVSR - View Document | |
Mechanism Design for Mixed Bidders Yoram Bachrach Sofia Ceppi Ian A. KashDocID: 1xUcY - View Document | |
PDF DocumentDocID: 1xK75 - View Document | |
PDF DocumentDocID: 1wPek - View Document | |
PDF DocumentDocID: 1wk8a - View Document |