The Effect of Offer Verifiability on the Relationship Between Auctions and Multilateral Negotiations* Charles J. Thomas Federal Trade Commission Division of Economic Policy Analysis

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Date: 2012-01-04 10:41:06 Auctioneering Game theory Auction Price Order Ask price Market Online auction business model Business Economics Auction theory		The Effect of Offer Verifiability on the Relationship Between Auctions and Multilateral Negotiations* Charles J. Thomas Federal Trade Commission Division of Economic Policy Analysis Add to Reading List Source URL: www.au.af.mil Download Document from Source Website File Size: 298,75 KB Share Document on Facebook

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