Strategyproof Mechanisms for Ad Hoc Network Formation C. Jason Woodard∗ David C. Parkes† Division of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Harvard University, Cambridge, MAMay 21, 2003

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Date: 2009-11-30 14:32:04 Game theory Mechanism design Strategyproofness VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism Distributed algorithmic mechanism design Double auction Incentive compatibility VickreyClarkeGroves auction Algorithmic mechanism design Network formation Mathematical optimization		Strategyproof Mechanisms for Ad Hoc Network Formation C. Jason Woodard∗ David C. Parkes† Division of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Harvard University, Cambridge, MAMay 21, 2003 Add to Reading List Source URL: netecon.seas.harvard.edu Download Document from Source Website File Size: 198,73 KB Share Document on Facebook

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