COMPUTING EQUILIBRIA FOR TWO-PERSON GAMES Appeared as Chapter 45, Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Vol), eds. R. J. Aumann and S. Hart, Elsevier, Amsterdam, pages 1723–BERNHARD VON S

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Date: 2006-01-20 12:37:20 Game theory Bimatrix game LemkeHowson algorithm Zero-sum game Nash equilibrium Complementarity theory Best response Strategy Linear programming Duality Expected value Continuous game		COMPUTING EQUILIBRIA FOR TWO-PERSON GAMES Appeared as Chapter 45, Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Vol), eds. R. J. Aumann and S. Hart, Elsevier, Amsterdam, pages 1723–BERNHARD VON S Add to Reading List Source URL: www.maths.lse.ac.uk Download Document from Source Website File Size: 183,05 KB Share Document on Facebook

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