Computation of completely mixed equilibrium payoffs in bimatrix games

First Page		Document Content
Date: 2012-06-24 02:05:21 Game theory Bimatrix game LemkeHowson algorithm Best response Zero-sum game Matching pennies Strategy Normal-form game Risk dominance Symmetric game		Computation of completely mixed equilibrium payoffs in bimatrix games Add to Reading List Source URL: faculty.biu.ac.il Download Document from Source Website File Size: 169,53 KB Share Document on Facebook

	Comparative Statics of Games Between Relatives IGAL MILCHTAICH Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan 52900, Israel E-mail: Web Page: http://faculty.biu.ac.il/~milchti DocID: 1qQPi - View Document
	CHARACTERISING EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN GLOBAL GAMES WITH STRATEGIC COMPLEMENTARITIES CHRISTIAN BASTECK*,◦ ◦ ¨ • DocID: 1qLYq - View Document
	On Some Saddle Point Matrices and Applications to Completely Mixed Equilibrium in Bimatrix Games DocID: 1qL7y - View Document
	EVERY SYMMETRIC 3 × 3 GLOBAL GAME OF STRATEGIC COMPLEMENTARITIES HAS NOISE-INDEPENDENT SELECTION CHRISTIAN BASTECK Technische Universit¨at Berlin, Department of Macroeconomics DocID: 1qEew - View Document
	C:/Pat_at_portable/latex/EnglishPub/MarkovMbid/latex8.dvi DocID: 1qBq5 - View Document