<--- Back to Details
First PageDocument Content
Game theory / Bimatrix game / LemkeHowson algorithm / Best response / Zero-sum game / Matching pennies / Strategy / Normal-form game / Risk dominance / Symmetric game
Date: 2012-06-24 02:05:21
Game theory
Bimatrix game
LemkeHowson algorithm
Best response
Zero-sum game
Matching pennies
Strategy
Normal-form game
Risk dominance
Symmetric game

Computation of completely mixed equilibrium payoffs in bimatrix games

Add to Reading List

Source URL: faculty.biu.ac.il

Download Document from Source Website

File Size: 169,53 KB

Share Document on Facebook

Similar Documents

Ashley  Fure,  August  13,  2016         Pigeonholes,  Precarity,  and  the  Zero-­‐Sum  Game  of  Time  

DocID: 1t2gA - View Document

Mathematics / Game theory / Leisure / Non-cooperative games / Binary operations / Blotto / Zero-sum game / Matrix / Minimax / Addition / Exponentiation / Game

C OLONEL B LOTTO : S EARCHING FOR PATTERNS IN A G AME OF A LLOCATION By Jeremiah Jones

DocID: 1rtXP - View Document

Game theory / Non-cooperative games / Nash equilibrium / Subgame / Trembling hand perfect equilibrium / Strategy / Best response / Extensive-form game / Zero-sum game / Matching pennies / Coordination game / Battle of the sexes

Chapter Three: Static Games* Game-theoretic modeling often begins with the simplest of structures, either in extensive or in normal form. Such simple structures are meant to define the players, their available actions an

DocID: 1roEf - View Document

Artificial intelligence / Logic programming / Academia / Decision theory / Game theory / Non-cooperative games / Situation calculus / Nash equilibrium / Zero-sum game / Markov decision process / Strategy / Mathematical optimization

I N F S Y S R E S E A R C H R

DocID: 1riTl - View Document

Game theory / Mathematics / Bayesian game / Science and technology / Complete information / Normal-form game / Nash equilibrium / Outcome / Zero-sum game / Science / Prior probability

An Empirical Study on the Practical Impact of Prior Beliefs over Policy Types Stefano V. Albrecht Jacob W. Crandall Subramanian Ramamoorthy

DocID: 1qvs8 - View Document