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Gaming / Nash equilibrium / Repeated game / Solution concept / Trembling hand perfect equilibrium / Robert Aumann / Outcome / Zero–sum game / Strategy / Game theory / Problem solving / Decision theory


Scand. J. of Economics 108(2), 185–211, 2006 DOI: [removed]j[removed]00448.x
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Document Date: 2006-08-09 13:00:54


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City

Malden / Oxford / /

Company

Blackwell Publishing / /

Country

United States / United Kingdom / /

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Facility

Mathematica Institute / Einstein Institute of Mathematics / The Hebrew University of Jerusalem / Hebrew University / /

IndustryTerm

cooperative solution / insurance contracts / /

Organization

Hebrew University / Jerusalem / Department of Economics / Israel Science Foundation / Center for the Study of Rationality / Hebrew University of Jerusalem / Einstein Institute of Mathematics / U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission / Mathematica Institute / /

Person

Michael Maschler / John F. Nash / Jr. / Andreu Mas-Colell / Eyal Winter / Robert Aumann / John C. Harsanyi / Shmuel Zamir / Robert J. Aumann / Elchanan Ben-Porath / Avinash Dixit / Reinhard Selten / /

Position

author / player / in particular player / informed player / Take player / punishing player / deviating player / row player / player / column player / lawyer / The row player / /

ProvinceOrState

Massachusetts / /

PublishedMedium

the Scandinavian Journal / /

URL

http /

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