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Supplementary Appendices to: "Was Sarbanes-Oxley Costly? Evidence from Optimal Contracting on CEO Compensation" George-Levi Gayle Department of Economics, Washington University in St. Louis and Federal Reserve Bank of St
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Document Date: 2016-04-25 17:57:00
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Supplementary Appendices to: "Was Sarbanes-Oxley Costly? Evidence from Optimal Contracting on CEO Compensation" George-Levi Gayle Department of Economics, Washington University in St. Louis and Federal Reserve Bank of St