Trust and Moral Hazard: An Analysis of the Motorcycle-taxi Market in Togo and Benin∗ Moussa P. Blimpo SIEPR, Stanford University 366 Galvez Street, Room 222 Stanford, CA 94305

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Date: 2013-03-31 00:58:05 Asymmetric information Market failure Economy Business Information Organizational theory Principalagent problem Legal professions Moral hazard Agent Law of agency Taxicab		Trust and Moral Hazard: An Analysis of the Motorcycle-taxi Market in Togo and Benin∗ Moussa P. Blimpo SIEPR, Stanford University 366 Galvez Street, Room 222 Stanford, CA 94305 Add to Reading List Source URL: afea.info Download Document from Source Website File Size: 488,60 KB Share Document on Facebook

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