Collusion in Auctions with Constrained Bids: Theory and Evidence from Public Procurement∗ Sylvain Chassang Juan Ortner†

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Date: 2016-05-27 10:45:44 Auction theory Game theory Auctions Anti-competitive behaviour Supply chain management Cartel Auction First-price sealed-bid auction Tacit collusion Collusion Bertrand competition Multiunit auction		Collusion in Auctions with Constrained Bids: Theory and Evidence from Public Procurement∗ Sylvain Chassang Juan Ortner† Add to Reading List Source URL: thred.devecon.org Download Document from Source Website File Size: 669,34 KB Share Document on Facebook

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