International Journal of Game Theory" Stable Bargained Equilibria for Assignment Games Without Side Payments I By B. Moldovanu2

First Page		Document Content
Date: 2014-03-26 06:49:17 Mathematical analysis Mathematics Game theory Functions and mappings Fair division Shapley value Limit of a function Bessel function Cooperative game theory J-structure		International Journal of Game Theory" Stable Bargained Equilibria for Assignment Games Without Side Payments I By B. Moldovanu2 Add to Reading List Source URL: www.econ2.uni-bonn.de Download Document from Source Website File Size: 1,13 MB Share Document on Facebook

	Measuring the Intensity of Attacks in Argumentation Graphs with Shapley Value Leila Amgoud1 Jonathan Ben-Naim1 Srdjan Vesic2 1 IRIT, CNRS - Universit´e de Toulouse, France 2 CRIL, CNRS - Universit´e d’Artois, France DocID: 1udLU - View Document
	On Economic Heavy Hitters: Shapley value analysis of 95th-percentile pricing Rade Stanojevic Nikolaos Laoutaris DocID: 1sRwZ - View Document
	IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SMART GRID, VOL. 6, NO. 6, NOVEMBERShapley Value Estimation for Compensation of Participants in Demand Response Programs DocID: 1rrKy - View Document
	International Journal of Game Theory" Stable Bargained Equilibria for Assignment Games Without Side Payments I By B. Moldovanu2 DocID: 1rkBP - View Document
	International Journal of Game Theory" Stable Bargained Equilibria for Assignment Games Without Side Payments I By B. Moldovanu2 DocID: 1rfHl - View Document