The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade∗ Dino Gerardi†, Johannes H¨orner‡, Lucas Maestri§ June 27, 2014 Abstract This paper characterizes the set of equilibrium payoﬀs in bargaining with interdependent

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Date: 2014-06-27 08:35:48 Problem solving Revelation principle Bargaining Mechanism design Incentive compatibility Support Price Futures contract The Market for Lemons Game theory Business Economics		The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade∗ Dino Gerardi†, Johannes H¨orner‡, Lucas Maestri§ June 27, 2014 Abstract This paper characterizes the set of equilibrium payoﬀs in bargaining with interdependent Add to Reading List Source URL: sites.carloalberto.org Download Document from Source Website File Size: 260,28 KB Share Document on Facebook

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