Mookherjee EC 721 Ec721 PROBLEM SET 3 SOLUTIONS 1. Suppose the policy space is a one dimensional real variable p, there are a finite (odd) number of voters each with single peaked preferences, with a median ideal point

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Date: 2015-11-11 14:55:31 Game theory Voting system criteria Decision theory Nash equilibrium Condorcet criterion Economic equilibrium Voting Thermodynamic equilibrium Independence of irrelevant alternatives		Mookherjee EC 721 Ec721 PROBLEM SET 3 SOLUTIONS 1. Suppose the policy space is a one dimensional real variable p, there are a finite (odd) number of voters each with single peaked preferences, with a median ideal point Add to Reading List Source URL: people.bu.edu Download Document from Source Website File Size: 95,79 KB Share Document on Facebook

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