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Game theory / Fellows of the Econometric Society / Ehud Kalai / Peyton Young / Nash equilibrium / Paul Milgrom / Bargaining problem / Kenneth Binmore / Solution concept / Abraham Neyman / Sergiu Hart / Bayesian game
Date: 2011-10-28 08:32:03
Game theory
Fellows of the Econometric Society
Ehud Kalai
Peyton Young
Nash equilibrium
Paul Milgrom
Bargaining problem
Kenneth Binmore
Solution concept
Abraham Neyman
Sergiu Hart
Bayesian game

Games 2008 Third Congress of the Game Theory Society July 13-17, 2008 Center for Game Theory and Economic Behavior Kellogg School of Management Northwestern University

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