CHARACTERISING EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN GLOBAL GAMES WITH STRATEGIC COMPLEMENTARITIES CHRISTIAN BASTECK*,◦ ◦ ¨ • - Brentwood, Tennessee - Document - PDFSEARCH.IO

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Date: 2013-10-21 03:26:58 Game theory Nash equilibrium Strategy Normal-form game Global game Supermodular function Symmetric game Strategic complements		CHARACTERISING EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN GLOBAL GAMES WITH STRATEGIC COMPLEMENTARITIES CHRISTIAN BASTECK*,◦ ◦ ¨ • Add to Reading List Source URL: www.macroeconomics.tu-berlin.de Download Document from Source Website File Size: 607,58 KB Share Document on Facebook

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