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Principal–agent problem / Constructible universe / Economics / Knowledge / Microeconomics / Asymmetric information / Game theory / Contract theory


Robustness and Linear Contracts Gabriel Carroll, Stanford University July 10, 2014 Abstract We consider a moral hazard problem where the principal is uncertain what the
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Document Date: 2015-02-26 17:17:13

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