Quarterly Bulletin / Central Bank Independence / Philips / /
Country
Belarus / Romania / Soviet Union / Moldova / Bulgaria / Czech Republic / / /
Facility
University of Rochester / State University / /
IndustryTerm
anti-inflationary institutional solutions / bank independence / institutional solutions / monetary commitment devices / bank legislation / bank targets / bank / immediate solution / oil sheikdoms / cental bank independence / bank conservatism / policy maker / commitment devices / institutional solution / political systems / policy makers / partisan policy makers / /
Organization
Michigan State University / UC Berkeley / University of Rochester / Bank of England / /
Person
Kevin Clarke / Randy Stone / Cristina Bodea / Thomas Sattler / /
Position
model a perfectly predictable economy / central banker / model / model / the executive and the wage setters / executive / delegate monetary policy / Assistant Professor / conservative central banker / bank governor / wing executive / /
Exchange Rate Regimes and Independent Central Banks: A Correlated Choice of Imperfectly Credible Institutions.∗ Cristina Bodea Assistant Professor Michigan State University