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Dolev-Yao model / Secure multi-party computation / Cryptographic primitive / Formal verification / Communications protocol / Transport Layer Security / Authentication protocol / Secure channel / Random oracle / Cryptography / Cryptographic protocols / Universal composability
Date: 2005-07-27 15:21:45
Dolev-Yao model
Secure multi-party computation
Cryptographic primitive
Formal verification
Communications protocol
Transport Layer Security
Authentication protocol
Secure channel
Random oracle
Cryptography
Cryptographic protocols
Universal composability

Report on DIMACS∗ Workshop on Security Analysis of Protocols Date of workshop: June 7 – 9, 2004 Workshop Organizers: John Mitchell, Stanford University Ran Canetti, IBM Watson

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