Schulze and Ranked-Pairs Voting Are Fixed-Parameter Tractable to Bribe, Manipulate, and Control

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Date: 2013-07-28 20:54:16 Voting systems Social choice theory Political philosophy Convex optimization Linear programming Operations research Ranked pairs Schulze method Condorcet method Single winner electoral systems Voting Voting system criteria		Schulze and Ranked-Pairs Voting Are Fixed-Parameter Tractable to Bribe, Manipulate, and Control Add to Reading List Source URL: www.cs.rochester.edu Download Document from Source Website File Size: 1,13 MB Share Document on Facebook

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