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Price of anarchy / Nash equilibrium / General equilibrium theory / Algorithmic game theory / Solution concept / Correlated equilibrium / Congestion game / Strategy / Swap regret / Game theory / Problem solving / Economics
Date: 2013-11-12 04:24:59
Price of anarchy
Nash equilibrium
General equilibrium theory
Algorithmic game theory
Solution concept
Correlated equilibrium
Congestion game
Strategy
Swap regret
Game theory
Problem solving
Economics

Intrinsic Robustness of the Price of Anarchy Tim Roughgarden Department of Computer Science Stanford University 353 Serra Mall, Stanford, CA 94305

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