Homogeneous Enclave Software / ACM Press / Reliable Distributed Systems / IEEE CS Press / Building Diverse Computer Systems / Intel / Controlled Heterogeneous Enclave Software / Microsoft / /
Currency
USD / / /
Facility
Cornell University / Kenneth P. Birman Cornell University / University of California / /
IndustryTerm
large systems / technology attacks / systems / software monocultures / technology attack / individual systems / hesitation software developers / obvious solution / even software / Internet Services Fail / software developers / identical computing platforms / Internet Technologies / cloud computing / software engineering tools / launch technology attacks / software systems / Web services / /
OperatingSystem
Isis / Microsoft Vista / /
Organization
School of Computer Science / Carnegie Mellon Univ. / US National Science Foundation / University of California / Berkeley / Univ. of Massachusetts Amherst / Usenix Assoc. / IEEE Computer Society / Cornell University / /
Person
Jay Lala / Ana Sovarel / Kenneth P. Birman / Jun Xu / John Manferdelli / Fred B. Schneider / Gene Spafford / Vijay V / /
Position
author / department and chief scientist / system administrator / professor / Butler / interpreter / /
Product
Disrupt Binary Code Injection / /
ProvinceOrState
California / /
Technology
Internet Technologies / operating system / Operating Systems / Defending Against Technology / /
IT Monoculture The Monoculture Risk Put into Context Conventional wisdom holds that software monocultures are exceptionally vulnerable to malware outbreaks. The