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A New Payment Rule for Core-Selecting Package Auctions∗ Aytek Erdil† Paul Klemperer‡
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Document Date: 2010-10-04 14:07:34

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Country

United Kingdom / United States / /

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Facility

Hausdorff Research Institute / Oxford University / University of Cambridge / /

IndustryTerm

repeated Internet-advertising auctions / /

Organization

European Economic Association / Oxford University / Hausdorff Research Institute / Department of Economics / Faculty of Economics / University of Cambridge / /

Person

Jacob Goeree / Ausubel / Paul Milgrom / Meg Meyer / Daniel Marszalec / Bob Day / Paul Klemperer / Peter Cramton / David Parkes / Marco Pagnozzi / Vj / Jeremy Bulow / Gerhard Dijkstra / Rocco Macchiavello / /

Position

editor / General / auction designer / auctioneer / /

URL

www.paulklemperer.org / /

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