Contractibility and the Design

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Date: 2009-10-21 16:00:23 Economic theories Contract law Corporate finance Industrial organization Theory of the firm Incomplete contracts Paul Milgrom Venture capital Contract Complete contract Intellectual property		Contractibility and the Design Add to Reading List Source URL: eml.berkeley.edu Download Document from Source Website File Size: 720,86 KB Share Document on Facebook

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