Optimal Voting Schemes with Costly Information Acquisition∗ Alex Gershkov† Department of Economics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem

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Date: 2014-02-02 05:15:05 Social choice theory Political philosophy Politics Public choice theory Game theory Decision theory Psephology Voting system Electronic voting Stochastic programming Mechanism design Independent voter		Optimal Voting Schemes with Costly Information Acquisition∗ Alex Gershkov† Department of Economics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Add to Reading List Source URL: pluto.huji.ac.il Download Document from Source Website File Size: 439,62 KB Share Document on Facebook

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