![Cournot competition / Markov perfect equilibrium / Tacit collusion / Nash equilibrium / Collusion / Cartel / Best response / Economic equilibrium / Symmetric equilibrium / Game theory / Economics / Problem solving Cournot competition / Markov perfect equilibrium / Tacit collusion / Nash equilibrium / Collusion / Cartel / Best response / Economic equilibrium / Symmetric equilibrium / Game theory / Economics / Problem solving](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/6c0e17ca233c17239ffd63250c238aae.jpg) Date: 2008-05-12 12:04:34Cournot competition Markov perfect equilibrium Tacit collusion Nash equilibrium Collusion Cartel Best response Economic equilibrium Symmetric equilibrium Game theory Economics Problem solving | | Impossibility of Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production By Yuliy Sannikov and Andrzej Skrzypacz* We show that it is impossible to achieve collusion in a duopoly when (a) goods are homogenous and fiAdd to Reading ListSource URL: web.stanford.eduDownload Document from Source Website File Size: 519,60 KBShare Document on Facebook
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