Impossibility of Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production By Yuliy Sannikov and Andrzej Skrzypacz* We show that it is impossible to achieve collusion in a duopoly when (a) goods are homogenous and fi

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Date: 2008-05-12 12:04:34 Cournot competition Markov perfect equilibrium Tacit collusion Nash equilibrium Collusion Cartel Best response Economic equilibrium Symmetric equilibrium Game theory Economics Problem solving		Impossibility of Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production By Yuliy Sannikov and Andrzej Skrzypacz* We show that it is impossible to achieve collusion in a duopoly when (a) goods are homogenous and fi Add to Reading List Source URL: web.stanford.edu Download Document from Source Website File Size: 519,60 KB Share Document on Facebook

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