Self Control, Risk Aversion, and the Allais Paradox Drew Fudenberg* and David K. Levine** First Version: May 12, 2006 This Version: February 5, 2010 This paper develops a dual-self model that is compatible with modern dy - David Allais - Document - PDFSEARCH.IO

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	Self Control, Risk Aversion, and the Allais Paradox Drew Fudenberg* and David K. Levine** First Version: May 12, 2006 This Version: February 5, 2010 This paper develops a dual-self model that is compatible with modern dy Add to Reading List Document Date: 2010-02-05 05:29:47 Open Document File Size: 754,84 KB Share Result on Facebook City Bernheim / / Company Cox / / Country United States / / Currency USD / / Facility Washington University / University of Illinois Champagne Urbana / Harvard University / / IndustryTerm related mental systems / commitment device / short-run utilities / bank / mental accounting / bank sub-period / direct mental accounting / food / / Organization Washington University in St. Louis / Harvard University / Department of Economics / National Science Foundation / University of Illinois Champagne Urbana / / Person Tao Jin / Lauren Merrill / John Kagel / David K. Levine / Glenn Harrison / Rabin / Stefan Krasa / Eduardo Azevedo / Daniel Benjamin / Franco Peracchi / Jesse Shapiro / Drazen Prelec / Juan Carillo / / Position representative / / ProvinceOrState Utah / Connecticut / / SocialTag Ethics Behavior Decision theory Social psychology Actuarial science Behavioral economics Expected utility hypothesis Allais paradox Self control Utility

Self Control, Risk Aversion, and the Allais Paradox Drew Fudenberg* and David K. Levine** First Version: May 12, 2006 This Version: February 5, 2010 This paper develops a dual-self model that is compatible with modern dyAdd to Reading List