Distributed Implementations of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms David C. Parkes Division of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Harvard University, 33 Oxford Street, Cambridge MA 02138

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Game theory Mechanism design Distributed algorithmic mechanism design VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism Strategyproofness Revelation principle Vickrey auction Agent-based model Incentive compatibility Algorithm VickreyClarkeGroves auction Multi-agent system		Distributed Implementations of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms David C. Parkes Division of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Harvard University, 33 Oxford Street, Cambridge MA 02138 Add to Reading List Source URL: www.eecs.harvard.edu Download Document from Source Website File Size: 116,55 KB Share Document on Facebook

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