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Outcome / Strategy / Normal-form game / Repeated game / Risk dominance / Game theory / Problem solving / Nash equilibrium


Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring1 Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine2 This version: [removed]First version: [removed]
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Document Date: 2007-05-29 08:07:41

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File Size: 220,69 KB

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Company

AMP / /

Facility

Washington University / Harvard University / /

IndustryTerm

public randomization device / public randomizing device / linear programming algorithm / /

Organization

Washington University in St. Louis / Harvard University / National Science Foundation / l’Hopital / /

Person

Eduardo Faingold / Andrzej Skrzypacz / Drew Fudenberg / See Fudenberg / Antonio Miguel Osorio da Costa / Yuliy Sannikov / Satoru Takahashi / Levine / /

Position

LR player / payoff matrix Player / longrun player / long-run and short-run player / short-run player / player / Because player / shortrun player / single long-run player / long-run player / reputation player / /

ProgrammingLanguage

FL / /

Technology

linear programming algorithm / /

SocialTag