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Artificial intelligence / Technology / Motivation / Metaphysics / Game theory / Futurology / Philosophy of artificial intelligence / Choice modelling / Utility / Expected utility hypothesis / Intelligent agent / Friendly artificial intelligence
Date: 2017-01-30 22:06:06
Artificial intelligence
Technology
Motivation
Metaphysics
Game theory
Futurology
Philosophy of artificial intelligence
Choice modelling
Utility
Expected utility hypothesis
Intelligent agent
Friendly artificial intelligence

The AI Alignment Problem: Why It’s Hard, and Where to Start Eliezer Yudkowsky Machine Intelligence Research Institute May 5, 2016

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