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Epistemology / Logic / Philosophy of science / Charles Sanders Peirce / Scientific method / Defeasible reasoning / Abductive reasoning / Deductive reasoning / Hypothetico-deductive model / Science / Knowledge / Reasoning
Date: 2002-08-09 08:57:00
Epistemology
Logic
Philosophy of science
Charles Sanders Peirce
Scientific method
Defeasible reasoning
Abductive reasoning
Deductive reasoning
Hypothetico-deductive model
Science
Knowledge
Reasoning

Simply the Best: A Case for Abduction* Stathis Psillos Department of Philosophy and History of Science, University of Athens, 37 John Kennedy StrAthens, Greece. , http://www.uoa.gr/dhps/postgrad

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