New York / Paris / Philadelphia / Cambridge / Chicago / /
Company
University of Chicago Law Review / MIT Press / Yahoo! / /
Country
France / United Kingdom / / /
Event
M&A / /
Facility
Northwestern University / Mimeo University of California Santa Barbara / University of Chicago / Becker Friedman Institute / University of California Santa Barbara / /
IndustryTerm
given site / historical solutions / individual sellers / coercive solutions / transportation routes / vote-buying systems / /
Organization
Booth School of Business / Harvard Law School / Department of Economics / National Science Foundation / MIT / Harvard / University of California Santa Barbara / Northwestern University / Assembly of Complements / John M. Olin Center / Land Assembly / Federal Communications Commission / University of Chicago / Becker Friedman Institute / I. Assembly of Perfect Complements When / Colombian government / /
Person
Andrew Postelwaite / Grossman / Balaji Narain / Louis Shavell / Sonia Jaffe / Thomas Palfrey / Zachary / Jeff Ely / Scott Duke / Oliver D. Hart / William Weingarten / Lee Anne Fennell / Stephanie Lo / Joshua Gans / Michael Whinston / Paul Milgrom / Jason Hartline / Greg Rosston / Steven Shavell / Alisha Holland / Daniel L. Rubinfeld / John Hatfield / Lawrence / Perry Shapiro / Yoav Shoham / Alison Lanski / Louis-Andr / E. Glen Weyl / Jonathan Pincus / Gustav Fischer / Tom Nicholas / Eric Budish / Eduardo Azevedo / Richard Steinberg / / /
Position
Prime Minister / planner / /
ProvinceOrState
Illinois / New York / /
PublishedMedium
Review of Economic Studies / Harvard Law Review / Communications of the ACM / Quarterly Journal of Economics / University of Chicago Law Review / /
Holdout in the Assembly of Complements: A Problem for Market Design By S COTT D UKE KOMINERS AND E. G LEN W EYL∗ tions of spectrum allocation. Finally, we conclude in Section III, with a number of open questions.