University of Chicago / Information Science University of Pennsylvania Philadelphia / Economics University of Pennsylvania Philadelphia / /
IndustryTerm
physical device / private algorithm / inefficient algorithms / inefficient algorithm / recent work studying large games using tools / utilities functions / communication devices / e - commerce / computing / proxy algorithm / arXiv preprint site / /
Organization
National Science Foundation / Mallesh M. Pai Department of Computer / Computer and Information Science University of Pennsylvania Philadelphia / PA School of Engineering and Applied Sciences Harvard University Cambridge / National Bureau of Economic Research / Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics / Economics University of Pennsylvania Philadelphia / Econometric Society / University of Chicago / Department of Computer / IEEE Computer Society / /
Person
Andy Postlewaite / David Xiao / Katrina Ligett / Anupam Gupta / Yu-Han Lyu / Stephen Chong / Irit Dinur / Moshe Tennenholtz / Ian A Kash / Kobbi Nissim / Claudio Orlandi / Lisa Fleischer / Kunal Talwar / Arpita Ghosh / Sergey Yekhanin / Salil P. Vadhan / Guy N. Rothblum / Tal Moran / Anindya De / Dov Monderer / Adam Smith / Al Roth / Jonathan Ullman / Frank McSherry / Avrim Blum / Justin Hsu / Yiling Chen / Ilya Mironov / Rann Smorodinsky / Salil Vadhan / Aaron Roth / Michael Kearns / Grant Schoenebeck / Krishnaram Kenthapadi / Moni Naor / Mallesh M Pai / Tim Roughgarden / Cynthia Dwork / Eric Budish / Nabil Al-Najjar / Tymofiy Mylovanov / Moritz Hardt / Eduardo Azevdeo / /
Position
editor / mediator / given player / player / single player / analyst / /
Product
Canon HR10 Camcorder / /
ProvinceOrState
New Jersey / /
PublishedMedium
Games and Economic Behavior / Journal of Economic Theory / Theoretical Computer Science / Econometrica / /
Mechanism Design in Large Games: ∗ Incentives and Privacy [Extended Abstract] Michael Kearns