Back to Results
First PageMeta Content
Nash equilibrium / Stackelberg competition / Schedule / Discrete mathematics / Minimax / Strategy / Solution concept / Game theory / Problem solving / Mathematics


Security Games with Multiple Attacker Resources Dmytro Korzhyk, Vincent Conitzer, Ronald Parr Department of Computer Science, Duke University Durham, NC 27708, USA {dima, conitzer, parr}@cs.duke.edu
Add to Reading List

Document Date: 2011-04-18 16:25:10


Open Document

File Size: 1,02 MB

Share Result on Facebook

City

Ann Arbor / Los Angeles / Toronto / Budapest / IRIS / Mumbai / Taipei / Estoril / /

Company

Multi-Agent Systems / /

Country

Taiwan / Hungary / United States / Canada / Portugal / /

Currency

pence / /

/

Facility

Duke University / Los Angeles International Airport / /

IndustryTerm

real-world applications / expected utilities / real-world security applications / game-theoretic solutions / polynomial-time algorithm / e - commerce / transportation networks / pseudopolynomial-time algorithm / /

Organization

Ronald Parr Department of Computer Science / National Science Foundation / Duke University Durham / /

Person

D. Korzhyk / V / Nash Equilibrium / Vincent Conitzer / C. Kiekintveld / V / Stackelberg / Ronald Parr / /

Position

model / security game model / player / /

ProvinceOrState

Nebraska / Massachusetts / /

PublishedMedium

Games and Economic Behavior / /

Technology

pseudopolynomial-time algorithm / 1 Introduction Algorithms / alternative algorithm / polynomial-time algorithm / 3.2 Algorithm / The algorithm / /

SocialTag