EFFECTIVENESS O F EU CO / Fordham Corp. / Lafarge / Loyola University Chicago Law Journal / /
Continent
Europe / /
Country
France / Portugal / United Kingdom / / /
Facility
College of Commissioners / European University Institute / LL.M College of Europe / College of Europe / /
IndustryTerm
competition law respect fundamental rights / competition law enforcement system / law proceedings / competition law community / finance / time wheN competition law / case law / competition law enforcement / competition law enforcers / competition law / conquered competition law / /
Organization
office of Fair Trading / College of Commissioners / Ministry for the Economy / LL.M Harvard Law School / Global Competition Law Centre / European University Institute / International Monetary Fund / EFTA / European Economic Community / European Central Bank / Federal Trade Commission / Universidad Complutense / European Parliament / DOJ / U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission / NCAs / General Court / Congress / Competition Commission / UK’s Competition Commission / Loyola University / Brussels School of Competition / European Commission / College of Europe / European Union / Portuguese Competition Authority / /
Person
Mason L. Rev / Mark English / Nicolas Petit / Alfonso Lamadrid de Pablo / Robert H. Bork / Claus Dieter Ehlermann / Luis Ortiz Blanco / George Mason / Giuliano Amato / Barry Hawk / Robert Bork / /
Position
driver / General Economic Interest / Lecturer / model of dual enforcement / /
Work in progress Please do not quote/ circulate Fordham 38th Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy, September 2011