UNIFYING VOTING THEORY FROM NAKAMURA’S TO GREENBERG’S THEOREMS DONALD G. SAARI Abstract. Cycles, empty cores, intransitivities, and other complexities affect group decision and voting rules. Approaches developed to p

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Date: 2014-11-04 13:01:35 Voting systems Politics Public choice theory Nakamura number Singly and doubly even Majority rule Symbol Social choice theory Voting theory Voting		UNIFYING VOTING THEORY FROM NAKAMURA’S TO GREENBERG’S THEOREMS DONALD G. SAARI Abstract. Cycles, empty cores, intransitivities, and other complexities affect group decision and voting rules. Approaches developed to p Add to Reading List Source URL: www.imbs.uci.edu Download Document from Source Website File Size: 212,33 KB Share Document on Facebook

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