Learning from Private Information in Noisy Repeated Games∗ Drew Fudenberg†and Yuichi Yamamoto‡ First version: February 18, 2009 This version: November 3, 2010 - Drew Fudenberg - Document - PDFSEARCH.IO

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	Learning from Private Information in Noisy Repeated Games∗ Drew Fudenberg†and Yuichi Yamamoto‡ First version: February 18, 2009 This version: November 3, 2010 Add to Reading List Document Date: 2013-02-05 00:25:26 Open Document File Size: 300,82 KB Share Result on Facebook Company Renault / / / Facility Harvard University / / IndustryTerm public randomizing device / / Organization Department of Economics / National Science Foundation / Harvard University / / Person Ai / / Position decrease player / player / Porter / informed player / Preliminaries Player / revealing player / / SocialTag Nash equilibrium Ordinal number Normal-form game Solution concept Economics Limit set Science Game theory Problem solving Outcome

Learning from Private Information in Noisy Repeated Games∗ Drew Fudenberg†and Yuichi Yamamoto‡ First version: February 18, 2009 This version: November 3, 2010Add to Reading List