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Matching with Preferences over Colleagues Solves Classical Matching Scott Duke Kominers∗,1 Department of Economics, Harvard University and Harvard Business School Abstract
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Document Date: 2009-12-01 08:03:55

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Wilson / /

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Finding All Stable / Harvard University / /

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machinery / historical and recent applications / deferred acceptance algorithm / profile applications / /

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Colleagues Solves Classical Matching Scott Duke Kominers∗ / 1 Department of Economics / Harvard University / Harvard Business School / /

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John Hatfield / Bettina Klaus / Drew Fudenberg / Zachary Abel / Alvin Roth / Andrea Hawksley / Peter Coles / Scott Duke Kominers / /

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Ps2 / ZTE C78 Cellular Phone / /

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last algorithm / deferred acceptance algorithm / one matching market.4 This algorithm / /

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